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AGENDA ITEM 3: AVIATION SAFETY

**UPDATE ON THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION'S UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
SECURITY ACTIVITIES**

Presented by the United States/Federal Aviation Administration

INFORMATION PAPER

SUMMARY

This paper presents an update on the United States (U.S.) Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) activities and coordination on security matters related to the safe integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS). The paper will include a UAS security overview and updates on UAS-related rulemaking, detection and mitigation coordination, remote identification, and Congressionally mandated research.

UPDATE ON THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION'S UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS SECURITY ACTIVITIES

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The rapid expansion of UAS operations in the NAS presents some unique challenges for both safety and security. UAS technology advancements have led to increased performance characteristics, such as increased altitude, range, endurance and payload capabilities, resulting in greater potential benefits to society. While it is possible to view UAS simply as a new and evolving threat, the FAA believes a more nuanced discussion on risk is an important aspect of UAS integration efforts. UAS security issues evolve from the careless, clueless, and, to a lesser extent, the criminal or malicious non-compliant operation of UAS. These unwelcome types of operations can cause risk to the NAS in the forms of security threats and safety hazards.

1.2 Fundamentally, the FAA seeks to integrate UAS into the NAS successfully and safely by identifying as accurately as possible the potential threats and hazards associated with non-compliant UAS operations and taking appropriate steps to minimize their impacts on aviation safety and security. Threats could include the use of UAS for terrorism, smuggling, or an operator flying a UAS in a flight-restricted area (e.g. prohibited area, national security sensitive area, etc.) with malicious intent. Hazards in turn are impacts to safety of airports, aircraft, public, and disaster and emergency response. The greatest unknown, and most concerning component of the risk calculus, is the determination of the intent of a UAS operator or operation. At this time, it is incredibly difficult to ascertain, in real time, the intent of a UAS engaged in unauthorized operations or operations that do not comply with applicable regulations or authorizations.

1.3 Further, the FAA engages with the UAS community to promote a joint understanding of goals and constraints in order to develop specific regulations and coordination requirements needed to support operations and reduce risk to the NAS. This engagement supports mutual education and facilitates common approaches and solutions. This Information Paper summarizes recent and forthcoming efforts by the FAA to address the security aspects of integration of UAS into the NAS.

2. DISCUSSION

UAS Security Strategy

2.1 Security is vital to UAS integration, and is achieved through partnerships among public and private stakeholders. The FAA's UAS security goals are to promote the safe and secure integrations of UAS by identifying, understanding, and assessing the risks associated with errant or malicious operations of UAS to protect the NAS, associated infrastructure, and public confidence.

2.2 The approach the FAA uses to address UAS security issues is through the strategic paradigm of Prepare, Promote, Assess, Act and Discover. By taking this forward-looking and continuous-learning approach, the FAA seeks to build security into the front end while maximizing the economic and societal benefits of UAS without compromising public safety, aviation safety, and national security.

Prepare

2.3 Prepare encompasses operating regulations to govern UAS community activities, such as rules pertaining to airspace access, operations over people, registration, and flights beyond visual line of sight. For flight near airports in controlled airspace, drone operators must receive an airspace authorization prior to operation. Airspace authorizations come with altitude limitations and may include other operational provisions. UAS are prohibited from flying over designated national security sensitive facilities from the ground up to 400 feet above ground level, and apply to all types and purposes of UAS flight operations. Examples of these locations are:

- Military bases designated as Department of Defense facilities
- National landmarks, such as Statue of Liberty, Hoover Dam, Mt. Rushmore
- Certain critical infrastructure, such as nuclear power plants

2.4 The FAA is continuing to consider additional requests by eligible federal security agencies for UAS specific flight restrictions as they are received. The FAA may issue temporary flight restrictions over some public venues, certain sporting events, and other locations such as wildfire firefighting activities and other disaster response.

2.5 Additionally, in early 2021, the FAA published the Remote Identification Rule that will help the FAA, law enforcement, and other federal agencies find the control station of a drone when it appears to be flying in an unsafe manner or where it is not allowed to fly. Remote ID also lays the foundation of the safety and security groundwork needed for more complex drone operations.

2.6 Furthermore, the FAA also works with our security partners and other stakeholders to develop policies, procedures, and agreements for the authorized use of UAS detection and mitigation technologies to ensure those operations do not negatively affect the safety and efficiency of the NAS and air traffic operations.

Promote

2.7 Promote is about ensuring that all stakeholders know and understand the rules associated with the use of UAS; how errant and malicious activities can affect the safety and security of the NAS; and the rules and procedures around the use of UAS detection and mitigation technologies. The FAA uses an intense public education and outreach campaign to reduce incidents of errant UAS operations. Efforts such as the “Know Before You Fly” information campaign, The Recreational UAS Safety Test (TRUST), and the UAS registration process serve as opportunities to ensure UAS operators understand the rules and responsibilities for safely flying an aircraft within the NAS. The FAA also works closely with federal, state, local, territorial and tribal security, public safety, and law enforcement agencies to promote effective enforcement and outreach actions that do not impinge upon lawful, compliant use of the NAS.

Assess

2.8 The FAA works closely with its federal security partners to assess the current state of play for security resulting from UAS incidents. A major piece of that is the appropriate detection, tracking, identification, and, if necessary, mitigation of UAS. While widely referred to as counter-UAS (C-UAS) there is an important distinction between detection and mitigation systems. C-UAS is defined in section 44801 of title 49, U.S. Code, as “A system or device capable of lawfully and safely disabling, disrupting, or seizing control of an unmanned aircraft or unmanned aircraft system.”

UAS Detection: Observation of UAS operations by technical means such as Electro Optical/Infra-Red (EO/IR), acoustic, radar, Radio Frequency (RF) receivers, and/or networked surveillance using shared positional and identification data.

UAS Mitigation: Actions taken to reduce the severity of and/or eliminating a UAS threat. Includes electronic and kinetic capabilities to warn the operator of the UAS; disrupt control of the UAS; seize or exercise control of the UAS or UA; seize or otherwise confiscate the UAS; and use reasonable force, if necessary, to disable, damage, or destroy a UAS

2.9 This nuance is very important when considering authorities, roles, and responsibilities associated with UAS detection and mitigation, especially within the airport environment.

2.10 All mitigation, and most detection, activity in the United States is limited by longstanding criminal provisions that prohibit interference with the types of technological systems used to operate UAS or the UAS itself. To date, the U.S. Congress has exclusively authorized four Federal departments to use UAS detection and mitigation systems within the United States, notwithstanding these potentially conflicting U.S. federal criminal laws, including laws related to electronic surveillance and aircraft piracy: the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and Justice. The relevant authorizing statutes enable these Departments and their component agencies to take certain actions to protect covered facilities

and assets from UAS-based threats. Each Department is required to coordinate closely with the FAA to ensure the use of these technologies do not adversely affect the safety and efficiency of the NAS. This coordination includes FAA reviewing any impacts to the NAS, including potential radio frequency interference to aircraft, communication, and navigation systems; any flight restrictions that may be necessary to mitigate secondary effects of UAS detection and mitigation activities on the NAS; the techniques, tactics, and procedures for employment; planned law enforcement response; and notice to the public and UAS operators. In addition, under section 44801 of title 49, U.S. Code, the FAA has limited authority to conduct testing of UAS detection and mitigation technologies at five domestic airports.

2.11 Although the U.S. Congress only expressly authorized these four Federal departments to take actions otherwise prohibited by law, numerous airport owners/operators, private companies, and law enforcement agencies are interested in the acquisition of UAS detection systems. To alleviate any confusion, and advise these entities of the legal considerations they should take into account when acquiring, testing, and using these systems, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Departments of Justice, Transportation, and Homeland Security, issued the *Advisory on the Application of Federal Laws to the Acquisition and Use of Technology to Detect and Mitigate Unmanned Aircraft Systems*. See <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/interagency-issues-advisory-use-technology-detect-and-mitigate-unmanned-aircraft-systems>.

UAS Detection

2.12 UAS are very difficult to detect using traditional radar and through visual means due to their small size and operating characteristics. Advances in UAS technologies necessitate creative ways to detect and provide the required situational awareness, especially in the airport environment. UAS detection technologies exist across several modalities, such as Radio Frequency (RF), radar, acoustic, and electro-optical/infra-red (EO/IR) cameras.

2.13 RF systems look for the unique signatures of the command and control link and video datalink frequencies in order to detect UAS. These frequencies are matched using a library of signals the system is designed to detect. The downside to this approach is that these detection systems will not successfully detect the UAS if the UAS is operating “dark” or not emitting, or uses a frequency not contained within the library.

2.14 Radar can successfully detect UAS, and is especially useful in detection non-RF emitting UAS. However, radar too has its limitations, especially in an urban environment. The small size and operating characteristics of UAS often cause the radar returns associated with UAS to be hidden below the noise floor. Lowering the noise floor to detect UAS can cause the “picture” to become too cluttered and potentially unusable to its normal operating purpose. The successful use of radar in the future, especially in the airport and urban environment, will require filtering to detect a signature of a UAS or the prop arc when a UAS is in a hover due to a “Doppler notch”.

2.15 Therefore, it is advisable to use a “system of systems” approach through sensor fusion to arrive at a higher probability of detection. For the FAA, UAS detection systems using passive RF, acoustic, and EO/IR capabilities likely do not introduce risk to the safety and efficiency of the NAS. However, we recommended that all parties considering deployment of a UAS detection system in the U.S. review with their legal counsel the aforementioned joint legal advisory on the use of UAS detection systems. Radar and other RF emitting technologies, however, may cause interference with a variety of aviation-related systems, depending on the frequency. Those who seek to use radar and other RF emitting technologies must coordinate with the FAA and the FCC to ensure they have the appropriate licenses for operation. Any installation of the above systems on an airport requires application through Part 77 of the Federal Aviation Regulations.

Remote Identification (ID)

2.16 Another tool to help with the detection of and response to a UAS operation is through Remote ID. The FAA recently published the final rule on Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft (https://www.faa.gov/uas/getting_started/remote_id/). When fully implemented September 16, 2023, Remote ID will help the FAA, law enforcement, and other federal agencies find the control station when a UAS appears to be flying in an unsafe manner or where it is not allowed to fly. Remote ID also lays the foundation for additional safety and security measures needed for more complex UAS operations.

2.17 The final rule on remote ID requires most UAS operating in the NAS to have remote ID capability. Those not operating with Remote ID must operate within a FAA-Recognized Identification Area (FRIA). Additionally, the FAA may provide a waiver to select security organizations that demonstrate a need based on operational security. Remote ID provides information about unmanned aircraft in flight, such as the identity, location, and altitude of the unmanned aircraft and its control station or take-off location. Authorized individuals from public safety and security organizations may request identity of the UAS's owner from the FAA.

2.18 There are three ways UAS pilots will be able to meet the requirements of the remote ID rule:

- Operate a “standard” remote ID UAS that broadcasts identification and location information about the UAS and its control station. A standard remote ID UAS is one that is produced with built-in remote ID broadcast capability in accordance with the remote ID rule's requirements.
- Operate a UAS with a remote ID broadcast module. A broadcast module is a device that broadcasts identification and location information about the UAS and its take-off location in accordance with the remote ID rule's requirements. The broadcast module can be added to a UAS to retrofit it with remote ID capability. Persons operating a UAS with a remote ID broadcast module must be able to see their UAS at all times during flight.
- Operate UAS (without remote ID equipment) at FRIAs sponsored by community-based organizations or educational institutions. FRIAs are the only locations UAS may operate in the United States without broadcasting remote ID message elements.

Act

2.19 When the errant or malicious operation of UAS creates a safety or security incident, the FAA works with its federal, state, and local security and law enforcement partners to ensure appropriate technical mitigation and non-technical mitigation enforcement actions are taken. To ensure safety the FAA promotes non-technical law enforcement intervention as the best initial course of action. This is due to the majority of incidents being errant, careless, and clueless operation and do not rise to a critical level requiring the use of technical mitigation whose operation can induce further risks to the NAS. The FAA addresses most violations of its regulations related to UAS through its compliance and enforcement program.

2.20 The FAA has traditionally relied on law enforcement entities to mitigate threats and hazards associated with manned aircraft; FAA follows that same approach in the case of UAS. Within the airport environment, the U.S. Transportation Security Administration of DHS has a lead role for addressing UAS threat, to include detection and mitigation actions pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 124n, as well as non-technical law enforcement intervention, TSA works in close coordination with local law enforcement during these non-technical law enforcement interventions. Additionally, the FAA is engaged in extensive outreach with federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement entities through its Law Enforcement Assistance Program (LEAP) to provide them with information regarding the evidence needed by the FAA to take enforcement action.

2.21 Engagements with the operator must go beyond just finding and interviewing the operator. The FAA advises that law enforcement should inform the special agents of FAA's LEAP so that an investigation can lead to referrals for successful FAA enforcement action or, where appropriate, criminal prosecution. FAA's goal is to ensure compliance with all applicable regulations to promote a safe and secure operating environment. There are several provisions in the United States Code, particularly in titles 18 and 49, and in FAA regulations, designed to promote compliance and ensure a safe and secure operating environment. For example, under 18 U.S.C. § 39B, it is a crime for an individual to knowingly interfere with, or disrupt the operation of, an aircraft carrying one or more occupants; recklessly interfere with, or disrupt the operation of, an aircraft carrying one or more occupants; or knowingly operate an unmanned aircraft within a runway exclusion zone. When violations do occur, the FAA utilizes civil penalties to deter future violations and address a lack of qualifications. In addition, the FAA works with its partners at the Department of Justice on criminal prosecutions in appropriate cases.

2.22 Use of mitigation technologies, especially in the airport environment, should only be considered as a last resort, and only by authorized entities. UAS are aircraft and mitigating UAS in the United States without specific legal authority may expose the mitigating party to legal consequences, including potential criminal prosecution. Currently, only the four U.S. federal government Departments previously mentioned are authorized to use technology to mitigate a UAS, and those Departments must closely coordinate with the FAA through established processes to minimize potential secondary safety hazards associated with the use of such technologies.

2.23 Mitigation modalities can be either kinetic or non-kinetic. Currently most systems fielded domestically involve net capture devices and non-kinetic modalities such as RF jamming and spoofing. Some RF jamming and spoofing have the potential to interfere with the aviation ecosystem's radio frequency spectrum and could present a hazard to aviation-related systems or non-targeted aircraft. Additionally as UAS become more sophisticated, security partners have begun to evaluate the use of Directed Energy weapons in the form of High Powered Microwaves (HPM), and lasers. Such systems may pose significant safety concerns to the NAS. At this time more research and a deliberate approach and consideration through the Safety Risk Management Process must be conducted prior to their employment in the NAS.

Discover

2.24 Finally, the FAA must continuously assess how current efforts are working towards the advancement of UAS Security and constantly seek to anticipate the future through effective research and evaluation. The rapid advancement and proliferation of UAS into the NAS, the gaps in operator education, and difficulties in ensuring compliance, have led many stakeholders to demand that the FAA allow the rapid introduction of systems for detection and mitigation of UAS into the NAS. Additionally, the lack of associated standards, and no clear certification process, create an untenable situation for ensuring aviation safety. The FAA is currently conducting research and evaluation of the safety impacts caused by UAS detection and mitigation systems, and has designs to conduct future research projects on the security aspects of Urban Air Mobility, Advanced Air Mobility, Unmanned Traffic Management, and cybersecurity.

2.25 For the study of the potential impacts to the safety of the NAS caused by the operation of UAS detection and mitigation systems and technologies, the FAA has stood up a test and evaluation program at five domestic airports as mandated by the *FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018*, Section 383.

2.26 Additionally, Section 383 requires the FAA to develop a plan for the certification, permitting, authorizing, or allowing of UAS detection and mitigation systems in the NAS and to convene an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to make recommendations for the plan.

2.27 The FAA is currently testing to evaluate at least ten technologies/systems that have the ability to detect and/or mitigate UAS in a civil airport environment. Initial testing is ongoing at Atlantic City International Airport (ACY), location of the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center. Systems may then graduate for additional testing at four airports selected for participation by the FAA. The FAA will use

the baseline performance data collected at ACY to help determine whether and to what extent other airport variables (e.g., geography, noise, interference, proximity to metropolitan areas, airport infrastructure, etc.) affects the performance of each technology and system.

2.28 The results from the FAA’s Airport UAS Detection and Mitigation Research Program are expected to inform the ARC and the plan required under title 49 U.S. Code 44810(b). In addition, findings from this research program may be used to update existing information published for airports on the use of certain, limited UAS detection technology. Any such interim information provided to airports following the completion of the research program may be subject to review and further revision based upon the completion of the ARC, NAS-wide plan and follow-on steps for full implementation of title 49 U.S. Code 44810.

3. ACTION BY THE CONFERENCE

3.1 The FAA will continue to collaborate closely with ICAO Member States, our security partners, law enforcement, academia, and private industry to produce a comprehensive and collaborative approach to UAS security in order to support the safe integration of UAS into the aviation ecosystem. The Meeting is invited to note the content of this information paper and visit the FAA’s UAS [website \(www.faa.gov/uas\)](http://www.faa.gov/uas) for more detailed information.

— END —